Scenario: convert_basic

Threat model for Dangerzone

16
Findings
6
Data Flows
4
Affected Components

Data Flow Diagram

Sequence Diagram

Show data flows
ID Name Source Sink Type
1 Start the Dangerzone App User DZ App Request
2 Select documents for conversion User DZ App Request
3 Send the suspicious document to the stdin of the gVisor sandbox DZ App doc_to_pixels.py Request
4 Rasterize PDF into pixels and write them to the gVisor sandbox's stdout doc_to_pixels.py DZ App Request
5 Reconstruct a safe doc from pixels to PDF (and optionally OCR it) DZ App Host storage Request
6 Save safe PDF with a '-safe.pdf' prefix DZ App Host storage Request

Applicable threats

Threat ID Description Target Component Mitigations
DZ-1-UPD DZ App verifies resources.updates
DZ-2-CODE DZ App is reviewed
DZ-2-BUILD DZ App is reproducible is verifiable
CAPEC-23 File Content Injection DZ App is sandboxed
CAPEC-131 Resource Leak Exposure DZ App is resource constrained
CAPEC-131 Resource Leak Exposure doc_to_pixels.py is resource constrained
CAPEC-153 Input Data Manipulation DZ App is sandboxed
CAPEC-176 Configuration/Environment Manipulation doc_to_pixels.py assume not compromised verifies resources.system
CAPEC-177 Create files with the same name as files protected with a higher classification doc_to_pixels.py assume not compromised verifies resources.system
CAPEC-186 Malicious Software Update DZ App verifies resources.updates
CAPEC-263 Force Use of Corrupted Files doc_to_pixels.py assume not compromised verifies resources.system
CAPEC-444 Development Alteration DZ App is reviewed
CAPEC-480 Escaping Virtualization doc_to_pixels.py
CAPEC-639 Probe System Files DZ App is sandboxed
CAPEC-639 Probe System Files Suspicious doc is sandboxed
CAPEC-639 Probe System Files Pixels (rasterized document) is sandboxed

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